[Jeffrey]

Trial of the Elements (Song of Wind and Rain)

Chilling wind and freezing rain;
the rooster’s shrill cries arise.
Yet what shall I have but rest,
with my husband before my eyes?

Shrieking wind and striking rain,
the rooster’s loud calls arise.
Yet what shall I feel but healed,
with my husband before my eyes?

All is dark in wind and rain,
and the rooster’s cries won’t end.
Yet what can I do but rejoice,
seeing my husband again?


*
This is my sparse rendering of a song from the Chinese Odes. Unfortunately, there is not much time in my ancient history class to touch on cultures beyond the West and Near East. I do intend to spend some time on the Classical era of Chinese culture, and these Odes are central to that culture.

There is a story that Confucius once asked his son if he had read the Odes. When his son said he hadn't yet read them, Confucius exclaimed that discourse would be counterproductive until his son had dipped into those great poems.

[Jo Mo]

Chinese Odes are kind of interesting. I have watched chinese movies that had someone in the feature singing. And the song would be very much like this one you posted here. It, in a way, reminds me of the Haiku.

[Nate]

Originally Posted by Jeffrey

Trial of the Elements (Song of Wind and Rain)

Chilling wind and freezing rain;
the rooster’s shrill cries arise.
Yet what shall I have but rest,
with my husband before my eyes?

Shrieking wind and striking rain,
the rooster’s loud calls arise.
Yet what shall I feel but healed,
with my husband before my eyes?

All is dark in wind and rain,
and the rooster’s cries won’t end.
Yet what can I do but rejoice,
seeing my husband again?

Wow. This wouldn't go over well in any academic circles I'm aware of. Feminists would have a hey-day with this doting affection.

It amazes me that all of our best love songs come from days when women were supposedly "objectified" and "owned" by men.

There was a guy who gave a presentation in our economics club recently about how "capitalism created the modern family."

His claim was that family today is more about love than it used to be. That marriage is now taken on for reasons of love rather than political or economic good. That parents now dote on their kids rather than expect them to contribute economically. That women are freer now from men and choose them out of love rather than dependence or necessity.

Everything about it seemed wrong, and yet when I made a comment concerning my disagreement, I was all but laughed at.

In a world where "single mother" is practically the de facto description of poverty, where is this alleged economic independence of women?

In a world where dual-income families are the norm, and daycare is all but, where is the "doting" parent? Why decry ancient "wet nursing"?

He brought up the terrible neglect of that ancient practice. How mothers would give care of their children over to others so they could work. Blah blah.

Then he went on to argue in the rest of his presentation that we were somehow different today!?! When I brought up daycare, it was just brushed off.

When I brought up that there are still major economic benefits to marriage, that the leading cause of divorce is money, I was told this didn't matter.

Everyone in that room but me, I imagine, saw the structural shift as going from dependence to liberty, from oppression of women to their freedom.

Really, I see the modern world as the exact opposite. When have women ever been more objectified? We don't need them economically at all.

We don't depend on our wives. They don't depend on us. Marriage isn't economic, no... it's hedonic. This isn't good. This makes women slaves.

The truth is that economic freedom is not the same as familial freedom. A woman "owned as property" did not have to work two jobs to feed her kids.

What the hell is so wrong with women depending on their husbands? Then, they are free to pursue other things: to love their kids, to learn, to live.

Women today are "free" only insofar as they are responsible for creating their own destiny and cannot depend on anyone else to help them out.

And so, women enter into the same indentured servitude as men, and enter into marriage not out of mutual submission [love] but out of social lust.

What modern woman would say "Yet what can I do but rejoice, seeing my husband again?" ? How are we more loving if we cannot even rejoice at each other?

There is a story that Confucius once asked his son if he had read the Odes. When his son said he hadn't yet read them, Confucius exclaimed that discourse would be counterproductive until his son had dipped into those great poems.

I had a professor who said that he would not advise or mentor any student until they had read "Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance", so I read it.

It isn't about zen, nor about motorcycle maintenance, and it is overhyped by the "Oooh, ahhh... I understand human psychology now!" pop-psych crowd.

Still, it is a wonderful read. It handles many of the same topics as my favorite title, Lewis' Abolition of Man. I feel very similarly to Confucius about that book.

I find it hard to converse productively about ethics, theology, or anything else with someone who cannot accept the two-fold premise of Mere Christianity, Ch 1.

That we know the good we ought to do, and do not do it [sidebar: that we nevertheless expect others to] is, to me, the single most important fact of humanity.

These are the themes that Lewis carries out in Abolition, and the themes that Pirsig handles [obliquely] in Zen. Pirsig tackles it non-religiously.

Pirsig's "good" is "quality," and he says that we can see it, innately, and that we act and believe [rightly, it turns out] that others see it [just like color] the same.

This is related to my comments about beauty in another recent thread. We act as if it really exists and react with outrageous disgust when it is questioned.

The one thing, to me, that sets Lewis' work [I feel so vain always praising him to you when you are, in the end, disappointed by him!] apart from Pirsig is his philology.

Pirsig had a bit of it, though. I think it was from him [in the follow-up, Lila] that the idea of the "Rta" factor arose: That combination of letters / sounds tracks "quality" closely.

The word ["rta"] itself comes from Buddhism, in the Vedic scriptures. The letters show up in philologically interesting places: "art", "virtue," "right," correct," "merit," "accurate," "true," "adroit," "dextrous," "trade," "craft," "great," "character," "cardinal," "trait," "property," etc.

This is obviously not scientific or archeological philology. It is sheer speculation. The abundance of words relating to virtue, quality, craftsmanship, goodness, etc with the letters "r" "t" "a" both very close together and usually [at least "r" and "t"] in the "rta" order is noteworthy.

["Worthy", see there's another one. Obviously, counter-examples can be found, but I think you'll find mostly support (ANOTHER!), rather than distrust (TRUST! ANOTHER!) in our dictionary.]

This is way on the fringes of anything bearing any semblance to scholasticism, but it's part of what makes Pirsig so interesting. What if this is true? Do symbols themselves have meaning?

Is this just sheer insanity [inanity?]? It's hard to put any stock in it. "r" and "t" are such common letters. This particular arrangement ["rt" close together in one syllable], though, actually isn't.

And, yet, if you scan through any sizeable chunk of text for words with syllables where "r" and "t" [usually also "a"] are close together in the same syllable, the results are actually quite eery.

[Jeffrey]

Originally Posted by Nate

There was a guy who gave a presentation in our economics club recently about how "capitalism created the modern family."

His claim was that family today is more about love than it used to be. That marriage is now taken on for reasons of love rather than political or economic good. That parents now dote on their kids rather than expect them to contribute economically. That women are freer now from men and choose them out of love rather than dependence or necessity.

Everything about it seemed wrong, and yet when I made a comment concerning my disagreement, I was all but laughed at.

Some of my students get upset when I say "How's that working for us?" when we contrast ancient and modern families.

Students are turned off by the idea of arranged marriages, viewing a marriage as a partnership and contract more than a "true love" thing, children being raised to take up responsibility at a younger age, etc.

But our divorce rates are 50%, our children increasingly dislike adults and authorities, adultery is common-place, emotional disorders are through the roof, middle class children are experiencing an "extended adolescence" of dependence on their parents until age 25 where once it was 16-18!

Of course, it wasn't all perfume and roses in ancient societies for women and children. I lean feminist in many issues.

But we forget that at many points in history, women enjoyed the same privileges they have now. I think of the ancient Minoan Cretans, for one. But I could argue for many eras of history.

In a world where dual-income families are the norm, and daycare is all but, where is the "doting" parent? Why decry ancient "wet nursing"?

"Doting" means "subservient," "friend" over "mentor." And yes, what is old is new again.

I'm going to get in trouble for this, but I think modern elementary education is part of the problem. Exactly the time when young children should be gaining a family identity and learning responsibility while also having time just to be kids, we shove them in classrooms with only each other and one adult (not the parent) as their main daily contact.

And we wonder why non-homeschooled kids are so often obsessed with approval from their peers instead of pursuing ethike (moral virtue)! It's Lord of the Flies with a non-parent hovering at the front of the room. A third to half of the day spent away from home! Ridiculous!

Ancient education (Babylonian, Greek, Israelite, Chinese) would involve home education, and then education one-on-one or in small groups when the student reached early teens - if they could handle it. Otherwise, they learned a trade. Our modern system is stifling.

He brought up the terrible neglect of that ancient practice. How mothers would give care of their children over to others so they could work. Blah blah.

Then he went on to argue in the rest of his presentation that we were somehow different today!?! When I brought up daycare, it was just brushed off.

Do you see why I want logic taught to all teenagers? The absurdity of the paltry analogical reasoning of your class.

When I brought up that there are still major economic benefits to marriage, that the leading cause of divorce is money, I was told this didn't matter.

Everyone in that room but me, I imagine, saw the structural shift as going from dependence to liberty, from oppression of women to their freedom.

Suffocating under a self-congratulatory, short-sighted narrative. O Columbia pulchra! Proletariorum canamus gloriam! Oh, these closet Marxists wanting to feel that their day and age is superior.

Waitaminute, ain't you at Block's Loyola? Where he got crucified for presenting data instead of slogans?

Really, I see the modern world as the exact opposite. When have women ever been more objectified? We don't need them economically at all.

We don't depend on our wives. They don't depend on us. Marriage isn't economic, no... it's hedonic. This isn't good. This makes women slaves.

And makes families group therapy sessions run by amateurs.

What the hell is so wrong with women depending on their husbands? Then, they are free to pursue other things: to love their kids, to learn, to live.

But, from a legal standpoint, would you open this up to a stay-at-home dad or to two men cohabiting because one wants to depend on the other and the other likes that dependence?

Women today are "free" only insofar as they are responsible for creating their own destiny and cannot depend on anyone else to help them out.

Sartre said "Man is condemned to be free," but he undoubtedly meant both genders.

What modern woman would say "Yet what can I do but rejoice, seeing my husband again?" ? How are we more loving if we cannot even rejoice at each other?

In all honesty, I think many women could say this. But it wouldn't be praised in culturally-universal works anymore.

I had a professor who said that he would not advise or mentor any student until they had read "Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance", so I read it.

It isn't about zen, nor about motorcycle maintenance, and it is overhyped by the "Oooh, ahhh... I understand human psychology now!" pop-psych crowd.

I had a high school teacher recommend it. She was disappointed, I think, that I did not go head-over-heels for it. It did inspire a lot of knuckleheads to think they grasped philosophy and psychology. Phaedrus' reading of Aristotle was WOEFULLY inadequate. Still, I doubt it'll be read in 200 years but I enjoyed it overall and own my own copy. It was over-hyped, but it was also unlike anything else at the time.

Still, the part where he is finally committed because (paraphrasing) "the cigarettes had burnt down to my fingers and the urine flowed freely" blew my mind. He had reached some grim enlightenment, but had to come back to the world he claimed to have found wanting in order to relate to others and retain a sense of self.

I'm probably misinterpreting it. I realized when I re-read it a third time recently that Aristagoras bears a great deal of similarities to Phaedrus. Since the probably-never-to-be-written novel about Aristagoras (that I outlined in college and wrote bits and pieces of, out of order, for my own pleasure) starts with him driving, there may be further parallels.

I find it hard to converse productively about ethics, theology, or anything else with someone who cannot accept the two-fold premise of Mere Christianity, Ch 1.

That we know the good we ought to do, and do not do it [sidebar: that we nevertheless expect others to] is, to me, the single most important fact of humanity.

These are the themes that Lewis carries out in Abolition, and the themes that Pirsig handles [obliquely] in Zen. Pirsig tackles it non-religiously.

I'm a bit peeved that in later editions, some references to Confucius were excised from The Abolition of Man. It would do Christians good to know that the basic "Do unto others" idea predates Christ's incarnation by several centuries...it even appears in an ancient Egyptian text!

I also wish Lewis hadn't appropriated the term Tao, though his use of it ain't too far from Confucius' approach (I lean more toward Lao Tzu; Confucianism is too trusting of hierarchy and tradition).

Pirsig's "good" is "quality," and he says that we can see it, innately, and that we act and believe [rightly, it turns out] that others see it [just like color] the same.

His stuff outside of Zen (Zen Buddhism has its roots in Daoism!) where he lays out his view of Quality as a solution to the subjective-objective issue in philosophy ain't so convincing, to me.

That said, I love Confucius and Cicero but I don't find myself in virulent agreement as when I read the Tao Te Ching and Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.

This is related to my comments about beauty in another recent thread. We act as if it really exists and react with outrageous disgust when it is questioned.

But beauty remains subjective. I love ska music and sometimes I can't understand why a favorite rollicking rocksteady track from 1963 doesn't get all toes a-tapping. I also derive little to no pleasure from watching athletes at work. But I understand why someone else might see a good football game, a well-executed play, etc. as a thing of beauty. I just don't myself see it as beautiful.

I also think "this waterfall is sublime" is subjective; Lewis is wrong.

Unless Lewis wants me to be able to say "This rotting gazelle, throat torn open by a lion, is sublime," or "This dry, lifeless heath is sublime" or "This fetid natural cesspool is sublime."

I'm not sure why Lewis feels there is an objective beauty to a waterfall. It's human for us to seek beauty in obvious places, but God did put a lot of work in His creation, and some of it is stark and invokes awe of trembling, not glee.

Hence why his Aslan was a lion, not a lamb. Lewis is obsessed with his subjective view of things. I, C.C. (or whoever I am), fear my subjective views taking precedent over all other voices in a discussion.

The one thing, to me, that sets Lewis' work [I feel so vain always praising him to you when you are, in the end, disappointed by him!] apart from Pirsig is his philology.

I haven't missed that PM of yours, I've just been so busy, and the last one enveloped me in a long response. I'll get to it eventually.

I feel that Lewis begs the question far too much. I do, of course, appreciate that he's a philologist. Lewis was also a pagan at heart who loved the Classics, so he and I connect there.

I wonder if the reason I don't find Lewis charming is because he and I have similar temperaments, so when I look in the mirror that is Lewis I see the flaws, and the wonders are dimmed because I've already experienced them. Which seems arrogant. And also, to me, rings false, because I find his logical reasoning (attempts to refute naturalism, demarcation of subjective and objective, his lousy trilemma) so woeful.

However, he and I love Balder and Bacchus. We love Latin (though he was far better). We're both meddlesome, middling poets. We live in ancient texts. We often trust our reason over revelation.

I wish he had been involved in the blossoming field of Sumerian and Hittite studies in his day; he would have livened things up.

Anyway, going back Lewis' view of some intrinsic value system (which I uphold in the sense of the non-aggression axiom: "Do unto others," but not in terms of beauty; Lewis' patriotism blinded him to the nonsense of war, so some of his natural law views are stitted).

I advocate what you hint at here: a "common ground" sense of philosophy. As with language, we can only relate to people to the extent with which we share each other's value systems. I cannot relate to another save in the areas to which we share common ground. I can only talk about a blue duck if you will either agree that it exists, have seen it, or grant that it is possible to mentally picture or physically instantiate that object. And our discourse will be limited to whatever empirical or hypothetical statements or parameters we share.

Likewise, I do dig waterfalls. So I would be surprised to find out someone else doesn't fall silent in awe at the sight of one (or cry out in wonder). If someone does not, I do not view this as a failing on their part, only a barrier between us in a discussion of beauty.

Pirsig had a bit of it, though. I think it was from him [in the follow-up, Lila] that the idea of the "Rta" factor arose: That combination of letters / sounds tracks "quality" closely.

The word ["rta"] itself comes from Buddhism, in the Vedic scriptures. The letters show up in philologically interesting places: "art", "virtue," "right," correct," "merit," "accurate," "true," "adroit," "dextrous," "trade," "craft," "great," "character," "cardinal," "trait," "property," etc.

This is obviously not scientific or archeological philology. It is sheer speculation. The abundance of words relating to virtue, quality, craftsmanship, goodness, etc with the letters "r" "t" "a" both very close together and usually [at least "r" and "t"] in the "rta" order is noteworthy.

["Worthy", see there's another one. Obviously, counter-examples can be found, but I think you'll find mostly support (ANOTHER!), rather than distrust (TRUST! ANOTHER!) in our dictionary.]

The Vedas are not viewed as canonical by Buddhism, by the by. It's Hinduism, though some Buddhist sects syncretize.

Anyway, this is dubious. "Fart," "maladroit," "malefactor," "mordtat" (German word for murder or slaying, also Indo-European like Sanskrit).

I don't think there's anything significant to "rta" in greater philology. I think it's apophenia. I'd have to read more into it.

It seems to me to be tantamount to noting that the holy sound "om" appears in women, womb, tomb, etc.

This is way on the fringes of anything bearing any semblance to scholasticism, but it's part of what makes Pirsig so interesting. What if this is true? Do symbols themselves have meaning?

When you say "Do symbols themselves have meaning?" do you mean whether the symbol "t" has some meaning beyond the phonetic and cultural values we ascribe to it?

After all, "A" evolved through Greek & Latin from the Phoenician "aleph" (the Phoenician alphabet - GOD BLESS MY CANAANITES - also gave us Hebrew, Aramaic, and Arabic) from a symbol that likely meant "ox."

I do think there are subconscious values each individual ascribes to letters apart from their phonetic or cultural values. For instance, gray isn't always a sad color to me.

Is this just sheer insanity [inanity?]? It's hard to put any stock in it. "r" and "t" are such common letters. This particular arrangement ["rt" close together in one syllable], though, actually isn't.

Art, fart, cart, dart, part, sort, fort, invert, pervert, assert, divert...? Maybe I'm misunderstanding you.

And, yet, if you scan through any sizeable chunk of text for words with syllables where "r" and "t" [usually also "a"] are close together in the same syllable, the results are actually quite eery.

Apophenia, my friend. Read up on it. The magick of modern chaos or pop magicians like Grant Morrison or Alan Moore is basically creative apophenia. I once went a month where I couldn't stop seeing falcons. Were the falcons reaching out to me? Or was something just inspiring me to see things where normally I blocked them out?

For two years of my life, I ran into "37" all the time.

[Nate]

Originally Posted by Jeffrey

I'm going to get in trouble for this, but I think modern elementary education is part of the problem. Exactly the time when young children should be gaining a family identity and learning responsibility while also having time just to be kids, we shove them in classrooms with only each other and one adult (not the parent) as their main daily contact.

Certainly not in trouble with me.

Everyone on here should know where I stand on home-schooling v modern education.

Waitaminute, ain't you at Block's Loyola? Where he got crucified for presenting data instead of slogans?

Yes. Haha. Oh, this is still going on.

I also think "this waterfall is sublime" is subjective; Lewis is wrong.

I'm not entirely sure that's what Lewis is arguing there. It's more subtle.

I'm not sure why Lewis feels there is an objective beauty to a waterfall. It's human for us to seek beauty in obvious places, but God did put a lot of work in His creation, and some of it is stark and invokes awe of trembling, not glee.

I think of his argument more as:

"There is objective beauty somewhere and we do best when we acknowledge that."

The condemnation of "This waterfall is pretty" wasn't because it wasn't objective.

It was condemned by Lewis, it seems to me, because it denied another possibility:

Namely, that the waterfall possessed something inherently and objectively valuable.

Not that the waterfall necessarily was inherently beautiful, but that it might be.

The man who placed all of his stock in his own assessment of the situation was too narrow.

The other man was praised because he allowed the possibility that something external mattered.

Is this too subtle a distinction?

Anyway, this is dubious. "Fart," "maladroit," "malefactor," "mordtat" (German word for murder or slaying, also Indo-European like Sanskrit).

Teehee.

I would point out, however, that two of your counter-examples are only contra through prefixes.

I don't think there's anything significant to "rta" in greater philology. I think it's apophenia. I'd have to read more into it.

It seems to me to be tantamount to noting that the holy sound "om" appears in women, womb, tomb, etc.

I'm not saying I believe it, just that it interests me.

Like Lewis' waterfall-praiser, I want to believe that something besides my own symbolism matters.

When you say "Do symbols themselves have meaning?" do you mean whether the symbol "t" has some meaning beyond the phonetic and cultural values we ascribe to it?

After all, "A" evolved through Greek & Latin from the Phoenician "aleph" (the Phoenician alphabet - GOD BLESS MY CANAANITES - also gave us Hebrew, Aramaic, and Arabic) from a symbol that likely meant "ox."

I do think there are subconscious values each individual ascribes to letters apart from their phonetic or cultural values. For instance, gray isn't always a sad color to me.

Yes, I am thinking of that last bit: the subconscious.

But, I also think these subconscious values occur culturally, in addition to at the individual level.

Obviously, it's philologically impossible to make any case for it, but there seem to be associations.

Art, fart, cart, dart, part, sort, fort, invert, pervert, assert, divert...? Maybe I'm misunderstanding you.

Ahahaha. Yours are such etymologically boring examples!

Mine have passed through twice as many languages / cultures and retained the characteristic.

Could this have allowed more subconscious associations to have been built up with the sounds?

I don't know. I'm not making any positive claims here.

Apophenia, my friend. Read up on it. The magick of modern chaos or pop magicians like Grant Morrison or Alan Moore is basically creative apophenia. I once went a month where I couldn't stop seeing falcons. Were the falcons reaching out to me? Or was something just inspiring me to see things where normally I blocked them out?

For two years of my life, I ran into "37" all the time.

Sure, the random walk, the bane of all human future-telling!

I am not entirely convinced, though, especially in fields where we have complete control, like language.

The "ideal" language, generated by a computer, would have as much difference as possible in common words.

That would help us to dissociate more quickly two like-sounding words. What we find are common patterns.

Why should any letter be more common in our language than any other? Shouldn't they be used equally?

Why should a language developed and evolved completely through human input have any homophones?

Wouldn't it behoove us to change a word once it starts to become phonetically confused with another one?

Wouldn't it make more sense, except in the case of meaning-generating pre-/suffixes, to make unique words?

Wouldn't it aid comprehension if our most common words were also our most dissimilar, phonetically speaking?

And, yet, your list of short "easy" words with "rt" in them bely a striking sonoric similarity among our words.

Something makes us choose similar sounds for our most commonly spoken words. It doesn't seem random.

I'm not saying these associations arose because of any recognized meaning or with our human input.

If they are real, they are wholly subconscious....

Like the feeling that a waterfall should be sublime, regardless of our own personal impressions of it.

Too little time. I shall return to reply again later.

[Skeeter]

This is my new favorite thread.

[Nate]

Originally Posted by Skeeter

This is my new favorite thread.

This is my favorite forum, not least of all because I think we have some great writers on CGR.

I tend to derail threads, but I don't feel so bad in this forum, because I think it's kind of the point.

Why write a poem if there's nothing anyone can say in response to it? We must interpret poetry.

[Skeeter]

Originally Posted by Nate

This is my favorite forum, not least of all because I think we have some great writers on CGR.

I tend to derail threads, but I don't feel so bad in this forum, because I think it's kind of the point.

Why write a poem if there's nothing anyone can say in response to it? We must interpret poetry.

Precisely. I always find it fascinating when a poem is interpreted in a completely different direction than I intended.

Unfortunately, I haven't written anything of note recently (other than songs for Hooray for Gooba!) so I have little to contribute on that note and little time to contribute legitimate feedback and critique of other's poetry.

[Jeffrey]

Originally Posted by Nate

Certainly not in trouble with me.

Everyone on here should know where I stand on home-schooling v modern education.

I figured as much. I hope no one surfs on here and sees me condemning elementary education. The elementary teachers at my school are good people; the system still doesn't work.

I'm not entirely sure that's what Lewis is arguing there. It's more subtle.

I think of his argument more as:

"There is objective beauty somewhere and we do best when we acknowledge that."

The condemnation of "This waterfall is pretty" wasn't because it wasn't objective.

It was condemned by Lewis, it seems to me, because it denied another possibility:

Namely, that the waterfall possessed something inherently and objectively valuable.

Not that the waterfall necessarily was inherently beautiful, but that it might be.

The man who placed all of his stock in his own assessment of the situation was too narrow.

The other man was praised because he allowed the possibility that something external mattered.

Is this too subtle a distinction?

Perhaps. Obviously he was going (rightfully) after logical positivism, wherein guys like Ayer were saying that statements that aren't scientifically verifiable were meaningless. I feel that this falls under the category of "Things Lewis Wasn't Qualified to Dig Into," like why I tend to avoid biological debates (my knowledge being scanty; my opinions, like Lewis', yet being strong).

Still, I think it's important to note that "The waterfall is beautiful" finds its ultimate value based on subjective experience.

After all, if I say "All cats are mammals," that's true for all people. Or, better yet, if I say "All living cats have blood," it's obviously that I'm asserting that this is necessarily true for all people. If you were to assert "Some living cats do not have blood," we would be having a real disagreement.

But if I say "All chocolate gives a pleasurable experience," and you are allergic to chocolate or simply do not like the taste, I wouldn't be upset to find out you assert that "No chocolate gives a pleasurable experience." It's a difference of opinions.

Whether chocolate is pleasurable depends on the person asserting or confirming it.

Like Lewis' waterfall-praiser, I want to believe that something besides my own symbolism matters.

Well, this to me is where theism and atheism have to acknowledge a lack of common ground: both can speak about external meaning (as a hypothetical), but only a theist can acknowledge its existence. An atheist must necessarily (and I'm not making a condemnation here) note that all meaning is self-produced.

Yes, I am thinking of that last bit: the subconscious.

But, I also think these subconscious values occur culturally, in addition to at the individual level.

Yes, cultural values influence the choice of words.

Obviously, it's philologically impossible to make any case for it, but there seem to be associations.

Philology alongside history & psychology can build the case, I think.

Ahahaha. Yours are such etymologically boring examples!

Plautus: "Nothing human disgusts me."
Me: "Nothing language-related bores me."

Could this have allowed more subconscious associations to have been built up with the sounds?

I don't know. I'm not making any positive claims here.

Yeah, I jumped the gun before reading all your post. Your line-by-line style sometimes makes me think a complete thought has occurred that can be addressed by itself; this is faulty reasoning on my part.

I am not entirely convinced, though, especially in fields where we have complete control, like language.

Do we have complete control?

The "ideal" language, generated by a computer, would have as much difference as possible in common words.

That would help us to dissociate more quickly two like-sounding words. What we find are common patterns.

Why should any letter be more common in our language than any other? Shouldn't they be used equally?

Why should a language developed and evolved completely through human input have any homophones?

Wouldn't it behoove us to change a word once it starts to become phonetically confused with another one?

Wouldn't it make more sense, except in the case of meaning-generating pre-/suffixes, to make unique words?

Wouldn't it aid comprehension if our most common words were also our most dissimilar, phonetically speaking?

And, yet, your list of short "easy" words with "rt" in them bely a striking sonoric similarity among our words.

Our language is restricted to what is physically possible for us. One might argue that oddities or wasteful elements included in language are like vestigial organs.

Like the feeling that a waterfall should be sublime, regardless of our own personal impressions of it.

But a waterfall is destructive!

[Nate]

Originally Posted by Jeffrey

Well, this to me is where theism and atheism have to acknowledge a lack of common ground: both can speak about external meaning (as a hypothetical), but only a theist can acknowledge its existence. An atheist must necessarily (and I'm not making a condemnation here) note that all meaning is self-produced.

I think a lot of people, atheists and theists alike, forget this.

It is the single most important topic of deist debate, I think.

Yeah, I jumped the gun before reading all your post. Your line-by-line style sometimes makes me think a complete thought has occurred that can be addressed by itself; this is faulty reasoning on my part.

I don't think I've ever had a complete thought in my life.

In fact, I'm not sure that anyone else ever has either.

What the heck would a "complete thought" even be?

Our language is restricted to what is physically possible for us. One might argue that oddities or wasteful elements included in language are like vestigial organs.

But we don't even use a fraction of the sonic possibilities!

[Jeffrey]

In fact, I'm not sure that anyone else ever has either.

What the heck would a "complete thought" even be?

All that is currently being asserted on a topic and in that, what is the primary focus.

For instance, if I note that "Some cats can be born blind," this obviously has a great deal of assumptions in it ("Cats exist;" "my sources are correct;" "things can be categorized"). But the basic parameters are that I'm asserting something about cats, something about a characteristic they have, how much of the group of "cats" I'm referring to, etc. (etc! not to imply that there's much more).

Of course, my hobby-work in philosophy is leading me to conclude that occasionally artificial parameters is necessary. We must use abstraction to keep the ever-flowing river "still" so we can contemplate it.

There may be no such thing as completeness, only a shifting abstraction we employ in a certain event of discourse to decide what is being presented.

In fact, to stretch mathematics in a way that people often stretch physics, Godel demonstrated that no consistent system can be complete, and no complete system can be consistent. One must trade off something.

But we don't even use a fraction of the sonic possibilities!

But do we stick to certain ones not out of mystical significance or some association with past meanings but simply because they are easy?

There are many ways to skin a cat (poor kitty!). If I have a way that's effective, why learn another equally effective way unless someone can prove that it's a major time saver?

[Nate]

Originally Posted by Jeffrey

All that is currently being asserted on a topic and in that, what is the primary focus.

For instance, if I note that "Some cats can be born blind," this obviously has a great deal of assumptions in it ("Cats exist;" "my sources are correct;" "things can be categorized"). But the basic parameters are that I'm asserting something about cats, something about a characteristic they have, how much of the group of "cats" I'm referring to, etc. (etc! not to imply that there's much more).

But some things we say mean the exact opposite of what we say!

Our typical conversational language is replete with just these things:

"With all due respect" never implies respect, nor that any is due.

"It's the least I can do" always implies a burden greater than zero.

"Fat chance" or "slim chance" mean exactly the same thing: no chance.

"I'm not a racist, but..." or "I'm not a sexist, but..." or "I'm not homophobic, but..."

"Irregardless" vs "regardless" or "I couldn't care less" vs "I could care less".

"Cleave" to your wife, but be sure not to "cleave" apart your marriage to her.

"She danced like she'd never danced before": Amateur, or sublime expert?

My example in another recent thread: "I am anything but" / "everything but".

This doesn't just happen in language either. It's consistent in all daily life.

Take humor vs laughter. Most of us laugh numerous times every single day.

The things we laugh at in our day-to-day lives are, quite simply, not funny.

Taking pithy comments / situations out of everyday life makes for poor comedy.

The other night, at a small-group gathering, we were pestering a guy for being "old".

Sample "joke": "Oh man, you're not that old... just older than the rest of us. HAHAHA."

Even if you were to duplicate the entire scenario, say in film, it just wouldn't be funny.

In shows like The Office, the "comedy" is marketed as being "real life awkward situations."

It's patently obvious that it's nothing [anything? everything?] but. The "funny" stuff isn't real.

Who knows whether you are asserting anything about cats at all, Jeffrey! Why not dogs?

Pink sings a song "So what, I'm still a rock star, I've got my rock moves, and I don't need you."

The song sounds like [depending on how you interpret it] a plea for his return, not a victory cry.

Could you mean "No cats are born blind" when you say "Some cats can be born blind"? I think so.

Let me be clear: I'm not a deconstructionist, nor a post-modern. I am, for lack of a better word, an ironist.

I find language extremely self-defeating, paradoxical, and ironic. My blog title captures my thoughts here.

More than meaning the opposite of what we say, I think that our words sometimes mean more than what we say.

To use your rather warm and fuzzy example [ah, how you love cats!], you might mean "I could have been born blind".

Why not? We observe the world not to make sense of it for its own sake, but to make sense of our relationship to it.

To use terms I've used before, to reconcile the actual with the believed, the way things are with how we feel they ought to be.

You might arrive at the same place through a series of logical operations from your initial premise, but I don't think it works like that:

1) Some cats can be born blind.
2) All cats are mammals.
3) Some mammals can be born blind.
4) I am a mammal.
5) There is a chance I could also be part of the "some" subset of mammals, which incidentally includes cats, that can be born blind! [inference, though LOOSE]

That's one way to get from "Cats can be born blind" to "I could have been born blind," but I think similar transitions happen less logically.

Note also that I think this happens differently from the fictional waterfall-viewers that Lewis and Gaius / Titius described!

"This is sublime" does not say "I have sublime feelings" nor "I have feelings associated with sublimeness, namely humility."

Nor is it necessarily to say "I am sublime," "This is not sublime," or "This is banal." The irony isn't always so apparent.

I think, to bring this all back to bear on the topic, it might mean "This object's proper alignment vis-a-vis myself is altitude."

The irony here would be that we are pronouncing this judgment down upon the object! How can we say that God is holy?

God's holiness is made manifest to us, and we respond to it. This is all well and good, but then we make judgments of it!

We say "You are holy, holy, holy", classifying, describing [down-write], categorizing something we have no power over.

God gave to Man the right to name and classify the animals, signifying his dominion over all of the created order of flora/fauna.

And yet, we also to classify things to which it was never given us to name! When we say "You are holy," what does that mean?

What can it mean? Language, at least not descriptive language, does not exist to rightly describe the God-man relationship.

You know as well as I do that what is not said ["[t]what cannot be named"?] is at the very least as important as what is said.

How complete is a thought if it only includes what is actually asserted? How complete can it possibly be, given this framework?

There is a game I would love to play with you sometime. It is called "Zendo", and is based [LOOSELY] on principles [PRINCIPLES] of yin/yang/tao.

The idea is to inductively find a "rule" describing the construction of arrangements of game pieces, using only a few clues.

The clues consist of prior arrangements marked with a "yes, this follows the rule" or "no, this doesn't follow the rule" marker.

One player constructs the rule and describes the arrangements of pieces made by the other players, while they try to discover the rule.

The most brilliant thing about the game is that as much is said by the arrangements that don't follow the rule as by those that do.

How much of our thoughts are given by what we do not assert, as compared to the miniscule portion that we do say?

I find "all that is currently being asserted" a singularly uninspiring and unsatisfying definition of "thought," especially coming from you!

Of course, my hobby-work in philosophy is leading me to conclude that occasionally artificial parameters is necessary. We must use abstraction to keep the ever-flowing river "still" so we can contemplate it.

There may be no such thing as completeness, only a shifting abstraction we employ in a certain event of discourse to decide what is being presented.

In fact, to stretch mathematics in a way that people often stretch physics, Godel demonstrated that no consistent system can be complete, and no complete system can be consistent. One must trade off something.

YES!

But do we stick to certain ones not out of mystical significance or some association with past meanings but simply because they are easy?

There are many ways to skin a cat (poor kitty!). If I have a way that's effective, why learn another equally effective way unless someone can prove that it's a major time saver?

I don't know.

[Jeffrey]

Originally Posted by Nate

"With all due respect" never implies respect, nor that any is due.

Really? Because I use this with my boss from time to time.

"It's the least I can do" always implies a burden greater than zero.

Semantics. "Do" implies an action! But I see your point.

"Fat chance" or "slim chance" mean exactly the same thing: no chance.

True, many idioms have absorbed and neutered irony.

"I'm not a racist, but..." or "I'm not a sexist, but..." or "I'm not homophobic, but..."

Usually a preface to a statement that the author thinks will be taken the wrong way, not an admission of racism, etc. however!

"Irregardless" vs "regardless" or "I couldn't care less" vs "I could care less".

Well, that's just bad grammar.

"Cleave" to your wife, but be sure not to "cleave" apart your marriage to her.

Arg! I hate the word "cleave."

Take humor vs laughter. Most of us laugh numerous times every single day.

The things we laugh at in our day-to-day lives are, quite simply, not funny.

Taking pithy comments / situations out of everyday life makes for poor comedy.

The other night, at a small-group gathering, we were pestering a guy for being "old".

Sample "joke": "Oh man, you're not that old... just older than the rest of us. HAHAHA."

Even if you were to duplicate the entire scenario, say in film, it just wouldn't be funny.

Hm. Not sure I agree. Laughter is meant to imply levity, recognized absurdity, joy, etc.

In shows like The Office, the "comedy" is marketed as being "real life awkward situations."

It's patently obvious that it's nothing [anything? everything?] but. The "funny" stuff isn't real.

Maybe you just have boring friends!

Who knows whether you are asserting anything about cats at all, Jeffrey! Why not dogs?

Possibly when I type "cats" I mean something other than that. My ultimate meaning is unknowable. But you must assume there is a language game afoot for communication to occur.

It is impossible for you to decide my ultimate meaning. But you apply various possibilities and then inductively choose an option.

Pink sings a song "So what, I'm still a rock star, I've got my rock moves, and I don't need you."

The song sounds like [depending on how you interpret it] a plea for his return, not a victory cry.

P!nk (don't forget the exclamation point!) has a number of deliciously ironic songs. This undecidability is what makes her lyrics occasionally wonderful.

Could you mean "No cats are born blind" when you say "Some cats can be born blind"? I think so.

But could I mean "No cats can be born blind?"

Let me be clear: I'm not a deconstructionist, nor a post-modern. I am, for lack of a better word, an ironist.

I find language extremely self-defeating, paradoxical, and ironic. My blog title captures my thoughts here.

More than meaning the opposite of what we say, I think that our words sometimes mean more than what we say.

Dude, then read Derrida. You do lean toward deconstructionism and post-modernism! I think my philosophical goal may be (logic has no goals, bad boy that I am!) to show how to climb out of the pit that early Wittgenstein and the post-moderns dug to show the limits of language. The pit was necessary, but we can soon reach an apex.

To use your rather warm and fuzzy example [ah, how you love cats!], you might mean "I could have been born blind".

Why not? We observe the world not to make sense of it for its own sake, but to make sense of our relationship to it.

To use terms I've used before, to reconcile the actual with the believed, the way things are with how we feel they ought to be.

Our senses are our only source of data for the real world, so we do have to reconcile the data that is entwined with us as an entity with the external reality we feel is "out there."

You might arrive at the same place through a series of logical operations from your initial premise, but I don't think it works like that:

1) Some cats can be born blind.
2) All cats are mammals.
3) Some mammals can be born blind.
4) I am a mammal.
5) There is a chance I could also be part of the "some" subset of mammals, which incidentally includes cats, that can be born blind! [inference, though LOOSE]

That's one way to get from "Cats can be born blind" to "I could have been born blind," but I think similar transitions happen less logically.

Your syllogism is an inductive, analogical one. Your conclusion is not "loose" as much as "proper." An inductive syllogism can only raise a possibility, not a finality (whereas a deductive conclusion presents what must result from the data at hand, whether or not the data are reliable pieces of information).

However, I think our mind runs through these loops so fast that we feel we are using intuition when really we're using subconscious logic. Logic allows us to train our subconscious further.

Note also that I think this happens differently from the fictional waterfall-viewers that Lewis and Gaius / Titius described!

"This is sublime" does not say "I have sublime feelings" nor "I have feelings associated with sublimeness, namely humility."

Nor is it necessarily to say "I am sublime," "This is not sublime," or "This is banal." The irony isn't always so apparent.

Hmm. I do think it has the assertion of "I can recognize sublimeness." If I report that a cat I saw was green, this asserts that I know what a cat is and I know what green is. I may not! I may have seen a green raccoon and thought it was a cat. But I am asserting that I know what I have seen.

I think, to bring this all back to bear on the topic, it might mean "This object's proper alignment vis-a-vis myself is altitude."

The irony here would be that we are pronouncing this judgment down upon the object! How can we say that God is holy?

God's holiness is made manifest to us, and we respond to it. This is all well and good, but then we make judgments of it!

We say "You are holy, holy, holy", classifying, describing [down-write], categorizing something we have no power over.

We have no power over it, but we are asserting the ability to recognize it. Perhaps this is what the Spirit allows a Christian to have: the ability to recognize holiness.

God gave to Man the right to name and classify the animals, signifying his dominion over all of the created order of flora/fauna.

And yet, we also to classify things to which it was never given us to name! When we say "You are holy," what does that mean?

But we say "You are holy" because we have received a model from choirs of cherubim and God's own description of Himself.

What can it mean? Language, at least not descriptive language, does not exist to rightly describe the God-man relationship.

This I will grant. An abortive blog of mine (I keep meaning to write in it; I feel I have nothing to say to the ether) is at ideo...mancy...com (to frustrate search engines). I get into the idea of the ineffable there.

You know as well as I do that what is not said ["[t]what cannot be named"?] is at the very least as important as what is said.

Crispin Sartwell's translation of the Tao Te Ching has the first poem as this:

Naming things loses what unites them.
Failing to name things loses them into what unites them.
Words are limits that make experience possible.
But form and formlessness are the same.
Tao and the world are the same,
though we call them by different names.

Wittgenstein ended his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus thusly:

"Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen."

"What we cannot speak of we must pass over in silence

Or "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."

How complete is a thought if it only includes what is actually asserted? How complete can it possibly be, given this framework?

Ah, but it is complete in relation to what it is trying to transmit. However, what is unsaid hovers on the outside. A sentence gives form to a segment of the great formlessness so we can contemplate that aspect.

There is a game I would love to play with you sometime. It is called "Zendo", and is based [LOOSELY] on principles [PRINCIPLES] of yin/yang/tao.

The idea is to inductively find a "rule" describing the construction of arrangements of game pieces, using only a few clues.

The clues consist of prior arrangements marked with a "yes, this follows the rule" or "no, this doesn't follow the rule" marker.

One player constructs the rule and describes the arrangements of pieces made by the other players, while they try to discover the rule.

Fascinating! I need to move to Louisiana. Any good Classical schools in the Orleans area? I could meet Walter Block and get his signature tattooed on my arm (kidding, maybe).

The most brilliant thing about the game is that as much is said by the arrangements that don't follow the rule as by those that do.

It's a different rule each time the game is played?

How much of our thoughts are given by what we do not assert, as compared to the miniscule portion that we do say?

But a complete thought sets up parameters, however permeable.

I find "all that is currently being asserted" a singularly uninspiring and unsatisfying definition of "thought," especially coming from you!

Ah, but I wasn't defining thought. I was defining complete thought. "Thought" is a different can of worms.

[Role Modlin]

I've been doing my best to follow this discussion but my brain asploded about two posts ago.

[Jeffrey]

Originally Posted by Leboman

I've been doing my best to follow this discussion but my brain asploded about two posts ago.

Mine, too...but I keep talking. That is how to be a professional philosopher, I suspect.