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Originally Posted by Stealth3si Has anyone read Ludwig Wittgenstein's most influential philosophical work of the twentieth century about, as I understand it to be, absolute truth. |
We talked a bit about it in my Hume-Russell-Quine class, Frege seminar, Phil Lang class, and I think one more. I studied under somebody who actually met him (the guy also met Heidegger -- very interesting), and did a lot of writing on Wittgenstein. But they didn't get the Wittgenstein seminar (taught by the resident Wittgenstein-obsesser) together until I graduated, so I unfortunately only know about it indirectly. But I can say this:
1. Probably the single most badass philosophical move ever. After writing the book he declared he had solved all the problems of philosophy and retired. Hahahahahahahahaha.
2. He later figured out that he was completely wrong and took a very new direction. I happen to really like that new direction (the so-called "Later Wittgenstein"). Later philosophers (esp. Quine) smacked around the school that built on his earlier work so much that I can't exactly disagree with his decision to change direction.
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Originally Posted by Stealth3si 1.) Should it matter to a Christian philosopher whether he is holding temporal or theistic presuppositions?  |
Temporal? Well, to answer, of course the person you're dealing with matters. (Nietzsche was prescient here.) Philosophy is not merely some abstract math-game (a view that was, unfortunately, often underwritten by what the early Wittgenstein wrote) but a dialogue between people.
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Originally Posted by Stealth3si 2.) Is he absolutely sure about his conclusions?  (Careful now.) |
Haha, no, he certainly wasn't, at least not later on.
To explain a bit more: There are multiple interpretations of the Tractatus, and despite being short it's a very complex book, but they at least tend to converge on the direction that the analytic tradition has taken: Find a logically perfect abstract language, and by using it you'll solve all the problems of philosophy. Everything that we can talk about will be uncontradictorily articulatable, and everything else will just not be spoken of. (Hence the later logical positivists' claims that metaphysical, ethical, and religious statements are meaningless.) So he's dealing with a certain conception of what language is and should be and what the relationship between language and the world is and should be.